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Abstract
This paper presents a high-level access control model of the seL4 microkernel. We extend an
earlier formalisation by Elkaduwe et al with non-determinism, explicit sharing of capability storage,
and a delete-operation for entities. We formally prove that this new model can enforce system-
global security policies as well as authority conﬁnement. By treating sharing explicitly in the
abstract access control model we simplify considerably the reﬁnement proof towards the seL4
implementation. To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst machine-checked access control model with
explicit sharing of authority.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents an extension to the machine-checked, high-level security
analysis [8] of seL4. The seL4 kernel [4, 6] is an evolution of the L4 kernel
series [11]. The seL4 kernel aims to speciﬁcally support secure, embedded
devices.
The existing formal access control model by Elkaduwe et al [8] is based on
the classic take-grant model [12] and also, in parts, takes inspiration from the
EROS capability model [16]. The initial focus of the seL4 security model has
been to prove security theorems about the model, showing that it is suitable
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for enforcing mandatory, system-global access control policies and authority
conﬁnement. Isolation properties have been shown in more recent work [5].
The ultimate aim is to show a reﬁnement relation between the model of
Elkaduwe et al and an implementation in C of the seL4 kernel. This rela-
tion is to be shown in three steps. Our focus is the ﬁrst: reﬁnement between
the security model and an abstract operational speciﬁcation, which was de-
veloped in the L4.veriﬁed project [3]. That project aims to show the other
two steps: reﬁnement between the operational speciﬁcation and an executable
speciﬁcation, and from the latter to an implementation in C [10].
Our attempts to prove reﬁnement between the access control model and
the operational speciﬁcation have shown that features of seL4, which are also
present in other capability systems, make proof especially complicated. These
features are, in increasing order of complexity: non-determinism, deletion of
entities (not just capabilities), and sharing of capability storage. The ﬁrst,
non-determinism, is mostly technical and easy to treat. The second, dele-
tion of entities, is conceptually simple, but introduces a mismatch between
entities that occur in the security speciﬁcation and those that exist in the im-
plementation; an example is presented later. The third, sharing of capability
storage, introduces a conceptual problem. Moreover, if one naively formalises
the classical approach, a great deal of unnecessary complexity into the relation
between abstract and concrete states in the reﬁnement proof.
The contribution of this article is to treat all of these features directly in
the security model, extending both the existing formalisation and proof of
security. In particular,
• we extend the existing model to include non-determinism for an accurate
reﬁnement of failure conditions,
• we extend the model to include deletion of entities, which introduces a
change to the assumptions of the security theorems, and
• we provide the ﬁrst formal model and security analysis of shared capabil-
ity storage. Shared capability storage changes the basic predicates of the
analysis and introduces additional possibilities for transmitting authority
and information. We show how the analysis can be adjusted to account
for shared authority and we prove that the adjusted system is still suit-
able for enforcing mandatory, system-global access control policies as well
as authority conﬁnement and isolation.
All formal deﬁnitions and theorems in this paper are machine-checked in
the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL [14].
The resulting security model supports a reﬁnement relation that matches
entities and capabilities in the security model almost one-to-one with kernel
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objects in the operational model. This makes the security analysis slightly
harder, but it signiﬁcantly reduces the eﬀort of showing reﬁnement. The
latter is a much larger activity than the security analysis.
While the reﬁnement proof is not yet complete, enough progress has been
made to expose a security problem in an early version of the operational spec-
iﬁcation: even though a grant operation to transfer authority from a thread
A to another thread B is checked explicitly when started, an interruption
may occur, and another check is not made upon resuming the operation, even
though the authority could have been revoked from A during that interrup-
tion. The completion of the operation would therefore be unauthorised and
would not reﬁne the security model where all such operations are atomic. The
problem has been ﬁxed in the meantime, and shows how reﬁnement can be
used to expose subtle defects such as this one.
Although our work was motivated by the desire to conduct a reﬁnement
proof for seL4, we believe that the model of shared capability storage is general
and interesting on its own. Sharing is a common performance optimisation
and likely to be important in resource constrained devices. Instead of sweeping
it under the carpet “without loss of generality”, we believe that treating it
explicitly improves the clarity of a design and the precision of corresponding
analyses.
After introducing notation, we proceed by giving a brief overview of the
seL4 kernel and stating precisely what is meant by shared capability storage.
We examine how the traditional argument for shared capability storage leads
to unnecessary complexity, and then present the details of our extended formal
access control model and the associated security theorems.
2 Notation
Our meta-language Isabelle/HOL conforms for the most part with normal
mathematical notation. This section introduces some exceptions, as well as a
few basic data types and primitive operations on them.
The space of total functions is denoted by ⇒. Type variables are written
′a, ′b, etc. The notation t :: τ means that HOL term t has HOL type τ .
Sets (type ′a set) follow the usual mathematical convention. We write f ‘
A for a function f :: ′a ⇒ ′b applied to a set ′a set.
The option type
datatype ′a option = None | Some ′a
adjoins a new element None to a type ′a. We use ′a option to model partial
functions. Function update is written f (x := y) where f :: ′a ⇒ ′b, x :: ′a
and y :: ′b and f (x → y) stands for f (x := Some y).
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Isabelle supports tuples with named components. For instance, we write
record point = {x :: nat , y :: nat} for the type point with two components of
type nat. If p is a point, a possible value for p is notated (| x = 5, y = 2 |). The
term x p stands for the x -component of p. Updating p from a current value (|
x = 5, y = 2 |), with the update notation p(| x := 4 |), gives (| x = 4, y = 2 |).
The keyword types introduces a type abbreviation.
Implication in proof rules and theorems is denoted by =⇒ and
[[ A1; . . .; An ]] =⇒ A abbreviates A1 =⇒ (. . . =⇒ (An =⇒ A). . . ). Implication
inside object formulae is written →. This distinction is a technical artefact of
Isabelle/HOL.
3 seL4 and shared capability storage
As mentioned in the introduction, seL4 is a microkernel in the L4 family.
It comprises 8,700 lines of C code and provides the following basic services:
inter-process communication (IPC), threads, virtual memory, interrupts, and
capability-based access control. Access control governs all kernel services; in
order to perform any system call, a user process must present capabilities
that have suﬃcient access rights for the requested service. Consider, as two
examples, thread communication and creation. Threads do not address one
another directly, but rather through communication endpoints maintained
within the kernel. Two capabilities are required on an endpoint to send a
message through it. The sending thread requires a write capability and the
receiving thread requires a read capability. Creating a thread involves allo-
cating both a thread control block and a new capability to access that block.
Thus, for one thread to create another it must possess two distinct capabili-
ties for accessing kernel memory: one with space suﬃcient to store the thread
control block and another with space suﬃcient to store the new capability.
To support highly dynamic and conﬁgurable systems, the kernel allows
capabilities to be copied and revoked, and kernel objects, like the endpoints
and thread control blocks mentioned above, to be deleted. The required data
structures are the most complex part of the seL4 implementation [3]. Copy-
ing occurs when threads grant capabilities, and hence delegate authority, to
other threads via IPC. If a capability is later revoked the kernel must transi-
tively revoke all copies made from it, which simpliﬁes the removal of access to
resources from entire subsystems but necessitates careful bookkeeping in the
kernel. An object can only be deleted if it cannot be accessed from other parts
of the system, since the corresponding memory may be reused subsequently
for unrelated purposes.
Capabilities are stored in kernel objects called CNodes. Naturally, access to
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the CNode objects themselves is governed by capabilities of another type. But
since the security model abstracts from the types of capabilities, we instead
mark capabilities that provide access to CNode storage with a special store
right. Each thread control block contains a store capability for a CNode,
which may then contain store capabilities for other CNodes, and so on, giving
the associated thread access to a directed graph of capability storage—termed
a CSpace. In practice, the CSpace is often a tree or acyclic graph, but no
restriction is made in our model. In terms of this paper, the most interesting
observation is that a CNode, and thus the other CNodes reachable from it,
may be linked into multiple CSpaces: capabilities may be shared between
threads.
Capability models must address the issue of sharing if conclusions drawn
from them are to be valid. In a traditional capability model, the sharing of
CNodes can lead to spooky action at a distance. Consider three threads A, B,
and C, where A has a grant capability to B, but not to C, and where B and
C share all capability storage. Were A to grant a capability to B, it would
appear in the storage of B, and, because of the sharing, also in the storage of
C—even though A is not authorised to grant to C! Similarly, were a capability
deleted from B, it would also disappear from C. A high-level security analysis
that neglects the possibility of transfers through the indirect channel of shared
storage would be incorrect.
Sharing is traditionally addressed by arguing around it: that B and C
share capability storage amounts to grant authority between them in both
directions and should be modelled as such. Any action on the capabilities of
B must be immediately mirrored on those of C. There is nothing conceptually
wrong with this argument, but as sharing structures become more compli-
cated, so too does the relationship between the abstract model and the details
of an implementation. The security model must express both normal grant ca-
pabilities as well as additional ones to account for sharing. The formalisation
of the relationship between it and an implementation model is complex, and
proving that it holds is cumbersome. Moreover, there is no longer a simple
correspondence between operations executed in the two models: actions in the
security model depend on the state of the implementation model.
We contend, in this paper, that it is much easier and more convenient to
model sharing explicitly and to account for it directly during security analysis.
Further, any security monitor that operates according to the main theorems
of the model will have to account for sharing anyway. An explicit model of
sharing thus also beneﬁts implementors of security monitors.
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4 A Formal Model of Shared Capability Storage
This section presents an extended model of access control in seL4. Where
necessary, we repeat deﬁnitions from Elkaduwe et al [8]. The extensions are
non-determinism, deletion of entities (not just capabilities), and sharing of
capability storage.
The model is presented in several parts as we work toward the goal of
stating and proving a security theorem about all possible system behaviours.
We start by deﬁning capabilities and global state in Sect. 4.1. We then, in
Sect. 4.2 deﬁne what it means for authority to leak, and, in Sect. 4.3, how
the various operations change the state of the model. The main lemmas of
the security proof are stated in Sect. 4.4 and generalised to subsystems in
Sect. 4.5.
4.1 Capabilities and global state
Following the Elkaduwe model, we do not distinguish between active (e.g. a
thread) and passive (e.g. memory) objects, but rather call all kernel objects
entities. Formally, an entity is just a set of capabilities, which is the only
property of interest at this level.
types entity = cap set
Elkaduwe et al [8] model the global state of the security model with a total
function and a separate explicit domain. We instead use a partial function
from entity-ids to entities, to later make the delete command easier to include.
types state = entity-id ⇒ entity option
Testing for None suﬃces to determine whether an entity is part of the state.
is-entity :: state ⇒ entity-id ⇒ bool
is-entity s e ≡ s e = None
Capabilities are likewise deﬁned as a record with two ﬁelds: (a) an identiﬁer
which names a target entity and (b) a set of access rights which deﬁnes the
operations the holder is authorised to perform.
record cap = {entity :: entity-id, rights :: rights set}
where datatype rights = Read | Write | Grant | Create | Store
The datatype rights deﬁnes the ﬁve primitive access rights in our model.
Read and Write signify the ability to read and write information. Possessing
the Create right allows an entity the creation of new entities. An entity with
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a Grant right to another is able to grant its capabilities to this other entity.
The Store right models the concept of shared capabilities. If an entity has a
Store rights to another entity, then it has direct access to all the capabilities
stored in that entity. Since multiple entities can have a Store capability to a
single entity, this allows sharing of capabilities. We use the term all-rights to
denote the set of all access rights; formally all-rights = {Read, Write, Grant,
Create, Store}.
We say entities possess both direct capabilities (those possessed by the
entity itself) and indirect capabilities (those possessed by entities that are
store connected).
Thus to get the complete set of capabilities of an entity, caps-of s e, we
get the direct-caps-of of all of the entities that are store-connected to e, where
store-connected is deﬁned as the transitive, reﬂexive closure of store-connected-direct,
as shown below.
direct-caps-of :: state ⇒ entity-id ⇒ cap set
direct-caps-of s sref ≡ case s sref of None ⇒ {} | Some e ⇒ e
caps-with-store :: state ⇒ entity-id ⇒ cap set
caps-with-store s e ≡ {c ′ ∈ direct-caps-of s e. Store ∈ rights c ′}
store-connected-direct :: state ⇒ (entity-id × entity-id) set
store-connected-direct s ≡ {(ex, ey). ey ∈ entity ‘ caps-with-store s ex}
store-connected :: state ⇒ (entity-id × entity-id) set
store-connected s ≡ (store-connected-direct s)∗
caps-of :: state ⇒ entity-id ⇒ cap set
caps-of s e ≡ ⋃ direct-caps-of s ‘ {e ′. (e, e ′) ∈ store-connected s}
Example
To better understand the above deﬁnitions, let us consider a small example,
where the state s is deﬁned by:
s id i = Some e i, i = 0, 1, 2
where the 3 entities are deﬁned by:
e0 ≡ {(|entity = id1, rights = {Store}|)}
e1 ≡ {(|entity = id2, rights = {Grant}|)}
e2 ≡ {}
We can then examine the various capabilities of these entities.
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direct-caps-of s id0 = {(|entity = id1, rights = {Store}|)}
direct-caps-of s id1 = {(|entity = id2, rights = {Grant}|)}
direct-caps-of s id2 = {}
We can then work out which entities are store-connected to each other. Any
entity is store-connected to itself by deﬁnition, and also to those that are
connected via a series of Store rights. Thus,
store-connected s = {(id0, id0), (id1, id1), (id2, id2), (id0, id1)}
From this, we can determine the capabilities of each of the entities, which
are those directly possessed by the entity themselves and those possessed by
store-connected entities.
caps-of s id0 = {(|entity = id1, rights = {Store}|), (|entity = id2, rights = {Grant}|)}
caps-of s id1 = {(|entity = id2, rights = {Grant}|)}
caps-of s id2 = {}
Whilst it is possible to understand this model using the formal deﬁnitions,
the use of diagrams can greatly assist. Following the notation of Lipton [12],
we express the model as a graph, with entities as nodes and capabilities as
vertices. Thus we would represent the above state using the following Fig. 1.
Note that edge labels, e.g. Store ∈ c1, means that the right, here Store, is a
member of the rights component of c1, where c1 is a capability in e0 whose
entity component is e1.
e0 e1Store  c1
e2Grant  c2
Fig. 1. Diagram representation of the example.
Because we are generally interested in the capabilities (rather than just the
direct capabilities) of an entity, we introduce the dashed arrow to represent
these capabilities. Intuitively, the dashed arrow represents a series of zero or
more Store capabilities, followed by one capability of a certain type as shown
in Fig. 2.
4.2 Leak
As in the Elkaduwe model, the central lemma of the security analysis predicts,
given the current state, the future distribution of authority. This reduces to
the question of whether authority, viz capabilities, can leak between entities
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e0 e2Grant  c2
Fig. 2. Alternate diagram representation of the example.
in a state, which in turn enables us to identify partitions of the system where
collective authority does not increase.
We now deﬁne what it means for a capability to leak from one subsystem
to another. The deﬁnitions are needed later when we prove that a capability
can only be transferred from one entity to another if those entities are already
transitively connected. We write s  x → y to denote that entity x has the
ability to leak authority to entity y in state s, which is possible if x has a
grant capability to y, if either has store access to the other, or if they both
have store access to a common entity.
leak :: state ⇒ entity-id ⇒ entity-id ⇒ bool
s  x → y ≡ grant-cap y :< caps-of s x ∨ shares-caps s x y
where grant-cap x ≡ (|entity = x , rights = {Grant}|)
shares-caps s x y ≡ ∃ ei. (x , e i) ∈ store-connected s ∧ (y , e i) ∈ store-connected
s
and c :< C ≡ ∃ c ′∈C . entity c = entity c ′ ∧ rights c ⊆ rights c ′
where the notation c :< C means that the capability set C provides at least
as much authority as the capability c.
If an entity can leak a capability to another, we say that the entities are
connected, which we deﬁne as s  x ↔ y = s  x → y ∨ s  y → x. The
connected relation is drawn with doubled lines and dual arrows in diagrams.
The three ways two entities can be connected are shown in Fig. 3.
The invariant property of the system relating to propagation of authority
is the symmetric, transitive closure of the leak relation, denoted s  x ↔∗ y .
The remaining subsections argue informally that none of the operations of
the system can connect disconnected entities, which will imply that we can
create authority-conﬁned subsystems. We introduce the formal deﬁnitions of
the operations as we progress through the proof. The entire proof is around
3000 lines of Isabelle script; here we show only the key lemmas.
4.3 Operations
Operations transform the state of the security model. In the Elkaduwe model
they must be deterministic but in our model they may be non-deterministic.
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xy
Grant  c
(a) Grant con-
nected
x
y
Store  c
(b) Store con-
nected
x
e
Store  c1
y
Store  c2
(c) Shared capabilities
x
y
(d) Connected
notation
Fig. 3. Diﬀerent types of connections between entities.
Non-determinism allows us to reﬁne the explicitly checked failure conditions
of the operational model. The main diﬀerence is that an execution step now
returns a set of states rather than a single state.
We will ﬁrst give informal deﬁnitions of the operations and argue that
their respective executions can never connect previously disconnected enti-
ties; neither through transitive grant capabilities, nor through the sharing of
capabilities. The precise deﬁnitions of the operations are shown in Fig. 7. The
arguments are formalised as lemmas in the next subsection.
Operations are only executed if they are legal, that is, if certain precondi-
tions about their arguments and the state are true, which are also shown in
Fig. 7.
Neither the SysRead e c nor the SysWrite e c operation change the state of
capabilities in the system. They clearly do not connect disconnected entities.
The SysCreate e n c1 c2 operation creates a new entity (n) by using free
memory provided by an existing entity (e1) and by assigning a new capability
for controlling access to n to existing capability storage (e2). It is only legal if
the initiating entity e has both a capability (c1) with create rights to e1, and
a capability (c2) with store and write rights to the CNode e2 where the new
entity’s capability is stored.
e
e2
e1
Store, Write  c2
e
e2
e1Create  c1
SysCreate e n c1 c2
n
all_rights_s
Store, Write  c2
Create  c1
Fig. 4. Create Operation
This operation cannot connect disconnected entities as the only new connec-
tion is to a new entity.
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The SysGrant e c1 c2 R c3 operation gives (a possibly reduced) copy of an
existing capability to another entity.
e
e2
e1Grant  c1
c2
e
e2
e1Grant  c1
c2
SysGrant e c1 c2 R c3
e3 e3
diminish c2  R
Store  c3 Store  c3
Fig. 5. Grant Operation
This operation clearly has the possibility of adding a capability to an entity
that did not previously possess this capability. In fact, if an entity x is store
connected to e3 and e2 store connected to y, then introducing a store connec-
tion between e3 and e2 will connect x and y. However a connection between
e3 and e2 is only ever created if a connection existed between e and e2, and
since e and e3 are already connected, any connections introduced are already
transitively present beforehand.
Both the SysRemove e c1 c2 and SysRevoke e c operations remove capa-
bilities: in the former case from the entity pointed to by c1 and in the latter
case from a whole set of entities. As in the Elkaduwe model, we do not specify
explicitly which set of entities is removed by revoke, because this set is tracked
in a complex data structure cdt (capability derivation tree) in the implementa-
tion that adds nothing that is relevant for our purposes to the security analysis.
Our formulation with nondeterminism makes this more natural than before.
Given this set, the revoke operation is then just a repeated call of remove.
e e2e1
c2
e e2e1
SysRemove e c1 c2
c1
c1
(a) Remove Opera-
tion
e
e2
e1
SysRevoke e c1
e3 en...
c1 e
e2
e1
e3 en...
c1
(b) Revoke Operation
Fig. 6. Revoke and remove operations
Clearly neither remove or revoke connect disconnected entities.
SysDelete e is a new operation introduced here. SysDelete removes an en-
tity from the state. In the seL4 implementation this allows the kernel to re-use
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legal :: Operations ⇒ state ⇒ bool
legal (SysRead e c) s = is-entity s e ∧ c ∈ caps-of s e ∧ Read ∈ rights c
legal (SysWrite e c) s = is-entity s e ∧ c ∈ caps-of s e ∧ Write ∈ rights c
legal (SysCreate e n c1 c2) s = is-entity s e ∧ ¬ is-entity s n ∧ {c1, c2} ⊆ caps-of s e ∧
Create ∈ rights c1 ∧ Write ∈ rights c2 ∧ Store ∈ rights c2
legal (SysGrant e c1 c2 r c3) s = is-entity s e ∧ {c1, c2} ⊆ caps-of s e ∧ c3 ∈ caps-of s (entity c1) ∧
Grant ∈ rights c1 ∧ Store ∈ rights c3
legal (SysRemove e c1 c2) s = is-entity s e ∧ c1 ∈ caps-of s e
legal (SysRevoke e c) s = is-entity s e ∧ c ∈ caps-of s e
legal (SysDelete e) s = is-entity s e ∧ e /∈ entity ‘ all-caps s
step ′ :: Operations ⇒ state ⇒ state set
step ′ (SysCreate e n c1 c2) s = {let new-cap = (|entity = n, rights = all-rights|);
newTarget = {new-cap} ∪ direct-caps-of s (entity c2)
in s(n 	→ null-entity, entity c2 	→ newTarget)}
step ′ (SysGrant e c1 c2 R c3) s = {s(entity c3 	→ {c2(|rights := rights c2 ∩ R|)}
∪ direct-caps-of s (entity c3))}
step ′ (SysRemove e c1 c2) s = {removeOperation e c1 c2 s}
step ′ (SysRevoke e c) s = if is-entity s e ∧ c ∈ caps-of s e then revokeOp e s ‘ cdt s c else {s}
step ′ (SysDelete e) s = {s(e := None)}
where
removeOperation e c1 c2 s = case s (entity c1) of None ⇒ s | Some C ⇒ s(entity c1 	→ C − {c2})
revokeOp sRef s xs = foldr (removeCaps sRef ) xs s
removeCaps e (c, cs) s = foldr (removeOperation e c) cs s
Fig. 7. Deﬁnition of, and preconditions for executing operations.
memory and the preconditions and book-keeping required for this operation
to be safely usable is complex. On the security level it can be expressed very
abstractly and nicely: An entity e is safe to delete, if none of the entities in the
state have capabilities that point to the entity to be deleted. In the security
model it would be suﬃcient to say that no other entity in the state has a
capability to e, but the seL4 implementation will clean up e itself ﬁrst in any
case, therefore it is no restriction to simplify the formula.
Since we deﬁne the state as a partial function from entity-ids to entities, the
deﬁnition of executing delete is trivial. SysDelete simply removes an entity;
therefore it cannot connect disconnected entities. We will see in the next
subsection that delete has an interesting side eﬀect that slightly changes the
formal statement of theorem 4.4 and theorem 4.5 as well as theorem 5.1.
Operations are governed by the functions legal and step ′, which are both
presented in Fig. 7. The former gives preconditions for operations, which are
only permitted if the entity involved e exists and has the required capabilities.
The latter describes the eﬀect of operations on the state.
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We can now deﬁne full single-step execution and lift it to sequences of
operations.
A function step combines precondition checks on the current state, from
legal, with the eﬀects of operations, from step ′. In contrast to the Elkaduwe
model, operations now return a set of possible states. The deﬁnition of step
ensures that the result always includes the initial state, thereby accounting
for the possibility that an implementation of seL4 may abort an operation
for reasons that are ignored in step ′. For example, an implementation of the
SysCreate operation will fail if it is not provided with suﬃcient memory, but
this kind of detail is irrelevant in the security model.
step :: Operations ⇒ state ⇒ state set
step cmd s ≡ if legal cmd s then step ′ cmd s ∪ {s} else {s}
A list of operations is executed by lifting step over sets of states and iterating.
Commands are read from right to left.
execute :: Operations list ⇒ state ⇒ state set
execute [] s = {s}
execute (cmd # cmds) s =
⋃
step cmd ‘ execute cmds s
4.4 Execution
This subsection introduces the formal statements of the main lemmas in the
security proof. We deﬁne sane as an invariant that is a precondition to most
theorems in our security model. We call a state sane if all capabilities point
to entities that exist.
sane :: state ⇒ bool
sane s ≡ ∀ c∈all-caps s . is-entity s (entity c)
where all-caps s ≡ ⋃ e direct-caps-of s e
We have shown that sane is invariant over execution:
[[sane s ; s ′ ∈ execute cmds s ]] =⇒ sane s ′
We have argued informally in the last subsection that none of the operations
in the kernel will connect previously disconnected entities. Formally this is
the following statement.
Lemma 4.1 If two entities in state s are connected after an execution step,
they must have been transitively connected before:
[[sane s ; s ′ ∈ step cmd s ; is-entity s x ; is-entity s y ; s ′  x ↔ y ]]
=⇒ s  x ↔∗ y
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The high-level structure of the proof is the same as in Elkaduwe et al [7]. As
there, we cannot directly lift lemma 4.1 to the transitive and reﬂexive closure,
such that [[s ′ ∈ step cmd s ; s ′  x ↔∗ y ]] =⇒ s  x ↔∗ y. We break the proof
into two parts: the SysCreate operation that introduces a complication for
this lifting step and transporter commands which move or remove capabilities
(all other operations). The second part has the simpler formal statement:
Lemma 4.2 Transporters preserve connected in sane states: 2
[[sane s ; s ′ ∈ step cmd s ; is-entity s x ; is-entity s ′ x ;
∀ e n c1 c2. cmd = SysCreate e n c1 c2; s ′  x ↔∗ y ]]
=⇒ s  x ↔∗ y
Note that we picked up an additional precondition compared to the Elkaduwe
model. We now need to know that entity x still exists in the post-state.
This is to get us later through the induction on sequences of operations with
SysDelete. To see why this is the case, consider the case when an entity with
id1 and an entity with id2 are disconnected. If entity 2 gets deleted, and entity
1 possesses a create right, then entity 1 is free to create a new entity with id2
in a later step. This new entity 2 is now connected to entity 1. Of course,
entity 1 did not gain access to the original entity 2, but just to a new, diﬀerent
entity stored in the same location.
Instead of strengthening the precondition, we could get around this by
introducing names for entities that are unique not only over the lifetime of
the entity, but over the lifetime of the whole system. These names would have
to come from an inﬁnite set. We chose not to do so, because this problem
exists in the implementation as well, and there is no way to implement such
system life-time names in reality unless the system runs for a known ﬁnite
time only. As for shared capability storage, we believed it better to bring the
problem out into the open and reﬂect it explicitly in the security analysis.
The create lemma remained almost the same, we merely need to add a
failure case. Note that the deﬁnition of ↔∗ and therefore the proof is now
signiﬁcantly more complex, though.
Lemma 4.3 Given entities x and y connected in the state after SysCreate e
n c1 c2, given that x exists in the pre-state s, and given that sane s, we know
s  x ↔∗ e if y is the new entity just created, or s  x ↔∗ y, or the operation
failed. Formally:
[[sane s ; s ′ ∈ step (SysCreate e n c1 c2) s ; is-entity s x ; s ′  x ↔∗ y ]]
=⇒ (if y = n then ¬ is-entity s y ∧ s  x ↔∗ e else s  x ↔∗ y) ∨ s = s ′
2 is-entity s y is implied by the other preconditions, thus is not necessary.
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Bringing the two lemmas together, we get the ﬁnal theorem on the connected
relation:
Theorem 4.4 If two entities in a sane state s are transitively connected after
execution, they already have been transitively connected in s:
[[sane s ; s ′ ∈ execute cmds s ; is-always-entity cmds s x ;
is-always-entity cmds s y ; s ′  x ↔∗ y ]]
=⇒ s  x ↔∗ y
The new predicate is-always-entity states that an entity exists in all intermedi-
ary execution states. It is the consequence of our strengthened precondition
in lemma 4.2.
4.5 Subsystems
With the notion of connected established, we can now generalise it to sub-
systems as before and show that it is still possible to implement authority
conﬁnement between subsystems in seL4 when shared capability storage is
present.
Authority conﬁnement means we can partition entities into subsystems
such that none of the entities in the subsystem ss1 will gain access to a ca-
pability to an entity of another subsystem ss2 if that authority is not already
present in ss1. If an authority is already present, then we show that it can-
not be increased. Note that subsystems can grow over time. We identify a
subsystem by an entity within it, thus we require that this entity remain in
existence for the period in question. As in the main theorem on the connected
relation, this requirement is new and due to the delete command.
We can produce a group of subsystems by having a master entity ﬁrst cre-
ating some child entities, and then by removing the grant and store capabilities
to these child entities.
e1
e4e3
e2G
W
W
G
C C
Fig. 8: An example of two isolated
subsystems. They can communicate,
but the capabilities between them can-
not increase.
Following Elkaduwe et al, we deﬁne
such subsystems using the symmetric,
transitive closure over the leak relation.
This partitions entities up into equiva-
lence classes.
subsys s x ≡ {e i. s  e i ↔∗ x}
We also introduce the same notion of a
dominates operator :> and use it to ex-
press that a subsystem cannot increase its
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authority over a speciﬁc entity. For this, we also need to collect all entities of
a subsystem with the subsys-caps function:
subsys-caps s x ≡ ⋃ caps-of s ‘ subsys s x
c :> C ≡ ∀ c ′∈C . entity c ′ = entity c −→ rights c ′ ⊆ rights c
The deﬁnitions are unchanged from Elkaduwe et al. The subsys-caps function
takes the set of entities in the subsystem, and then the union of all their
capabilities. Here, these are all capabilities that the entities transitively have
access to. A capability c dominates a capability set C (c :> C ) if C provides
at most as much authority as capability c over the entity c points to.
Since capabilities of an entity are those that are stored directly in entities
that are store connected, and since those entities would also be part of the
same subsystem, we can prove an equivalent deﬁnition for subsys-caps. This
is easier to work with, because it removes one level of transitive closure.
subsys-caps s x =
⋃
direct-caps-of s ‘ subsys s x
The equality allows us to ignore the impact of shared capabilities on the
transfer of capabilities between subsystems, but the SysDelete operation still
requires the added precondition that the entities in question exist continually.
Following essentially the same logic as [8], we can prove the result:
Theorem 4.5 (Conﬁnement of authority). Given a sane state s, a non-empty
subsystem spanned by x in s, and a capability c with a target identity y in s,
if the authority of the subsystem does not exceed c in s, then it will not exceed
c in any future state of the system for as long as x and y both exist.
[[sane s ; s ′ ∈ execute cmds s ; entity c = y ; is-always-entity cmds s x ;
is-always-entity cmds s y ; c :> subsys-caps s x ]]
=⇒ c :> subsys-caps s ′ x
5 Isolation
The security analysis so far was concerned with de-jure rights, i.e. rights that
are directly conferred by capabilities. If we are interested in the ﬂow of in-
formation through the system, then we need to consider de-facto rights. As
mentioned previously, de-facto rights model entities that may try to collab-
orate to transport information through indirectly authorised channels. If A
has read access to B, and C has write access to B, then de facto, A has read
access to C even though de jure, no read operation from A to C will ever be
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authorised by the kernel.
With entities divided up into subsystems as in the last section, we can
examine the ﬂow of information between subsystems in this sense. We do
not examine the ﬂow of information within a subsystem as capabilities can
be transported between entities within a subsystem by deﬁnition already.
Bishop’s [1] analysis of information ﬂow between islands is essentially the
same concept.
Unlike in Sect. 4.5 where we examined the symmetric closure of the leak
relation, information ﬂow is a directed relation. Elkaduwe’s original extension
to showing isolation in the information ﬂow sense is still bidirectional [5].
Since we know that the capabilities between subsystems cannot increase,
we can conclude that paths for information ﬂow cannot increase between sub-
systems over time. This motivates the following deﬁnition.
We say that information can ﬂow from one set of entities X to another set
of entities Y if either an entity of X has a write capability to an entity in Y,
or if an entity of Y has a read capability to an entity in X, which we write as
(X , Y ) ∈ set-ﬂow s.
Formally:
((X , Y ) ∈ set-ﬂow s) =
(∃ x∈X . ∃ y∈Y . read-cap x :< caps-of s y ∨ write-cap y :< caps-of s x )
From this we deﬁne the ﬂow of information between subsystems.
s  x  y = ((subsys s x , subsys s y) ∈ set-ﬂow s)
If we take the transitive closure of this relation we can establish when infor-
mation can ﬂow between two subsystems over time.
Theorem 5.1 If information cannot ﬂow between the subsystems containing
x and y in the present, then information will never be able to ﬂow between
any future subsystems that x and y are in (for as long as x and y both exist).
[[sane s ; is-always-entity cmds s x ; is-always-entity cmds s y ;
s ′ ∈ execute cmds s ; ¬ s  x ∗ y ]]
=⇒ ¬ s ′  x ∗ y
This theorem was proven by showing that each operation cannot create a
new ﬂow of information. By induction over a sequence of commands, we
can deduce the contrapositive of the above theorem. The main diﬃculty in
the proof comes from examining all the various possible cases produced by
SysCreate.
Thus, if you can examine the capabilities of the system, you can predict
the possibly indirect ﬂows of information through the system they authorise.
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6 Related work
The ﬁrst to formulate an access control analysis were Harrison et al [9]. They
introduced the focus on the ability of a subject to obtain a particular authority
over another in some future state.
As mentioned previously, our seL4 access control model is inspired by the
take-grant model [12]. The original analysis on the take grant model [12, 2]
already uses the same approximation to model the exposure of access rights:
the transitive, symmetric closure on the given initial graph. The diﬀerence
here is that we make capability storage and sharing explicit and that we
conduct all proofs in Isabelle/HOL.
Snyder [17] and later Bishop [1] introduced explicit de-facto rules into
the take-grant model for reasoning about the information ﬂow paths induced
by the capability distribution. Their concept of the maximum take-grant
connected subgraph is similar to our subsystems. In contrast to Bishop and
Snyder, we do not need to introduce additional rules into the speciﬁcation;
instead we model the impact of de-facto rights directly in the isolation relation.
Shapiro [16] applied the diminish-take model—another variant of take-
grant to capture the operational semantics of the EROS system. The ability
of seL4 to diminish access rights during the grant operation is inspired by this
diminish-take model.
None of the formalisations above model sharing of capabilities explicitly,
and none of them formalise and prove their security statements in a theorem
prover.
The most closely related work to this paper is the model of seL4 access
control by Elkaduwe et al [5, 7, 8] that we directly build on and extend.
Rushby [15] provides a formulation of isolation called non-interference.
Non-interference is stronger than the concept of isolation we use in this for-
malisation, because it goes beyond access control. It also includes covert
storage channels, whereas we are only concerned with the overt, explicitly
authorised, but still possibly indirect ﬂows of information. The diﬀerence
is that non-interference would for instance cover things like leaking informa-
tion by making an observable decision in the program that depends on secret
data. Non-interference traditionally talks about diﬀerent security levels that
should be kept separate, whereas we are in this model more interested in
which entities can communicate with each other in a highly dynamic setting.
Non-interference is not necessarily preserved under reﬁnement, so special care
would need to be taken to connect such a property to the operational model
and the C implementation of seL4.
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7 Conclusion
We have presented three extensions to the existing formal access control model
of the seL4 microkernel. The extensions are the inclusion of non-determinism,
a delete operation for entities, and an explicit treatment of shared capability
storage.
The ﬁrst extension was easy to add, the second introduced minor changes
to the main theorems, because the concept of entity identity becomes more
subtle. Explicitly modelling shared capabilities is the main contribution of this
paper. Sharing makes the access control model more complex and changes
the fundamental notions of the main security theorem. We have adjusted
the corresponding deﬁnitions and proved that the access control model is still
decidable. 3 This is a signiﬁcant result, because not all access control systems
are decidable [9, 13], and previous arguments on capability sharing we have
found in the literature were of the very high-level “without loss of generality”
kind. This main theorem implies that a monitor for system-global security
policies can be implemented.
Our more explicit access control model represents an almost complete one-
to-one correspondence to the existing operational model of seL4. The next
step in this project will be to complete the reﬁnement proof of the access
control to the operational model and therefore to the C implementation of
seL4, justifying the s in seL4.
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